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aesthetic are implied in the appreciation of artistic form. The writer
believes that the action of the new on the aesthetic sentiment is due
to the putting in motion of our activity of exploration. It is pos-
sible that the maximum of appreciation may be reached by the ' un-
expected recognition of a thing already familiar.' In such a case we
investigate at the same time that we synthesize, whereas when the
object and its nature are unknown, there is a movement of exploration
but not of synthesis. If the work of art furnishes our activities with
only one element, the other interests, however trifling, existing in our
lives will offer more or less resistance to the sesthetic interest. The
action of art is not hypnotic and mono-ideistic; it is in the highest
degree synthetic. Though in fact the first function of art is to ( ex-
clude,' that function is performed by art's enclosing of the attention
in a very complex and complete labyrinth where all our activities cross
and re-cross without isolating and avoiding each other.
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IDEALS.
The Genesis of Ideals. ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES. Jour, of Phil.,
Psych, and Sci. Meth., 1906, VIII. , 482-495.
Before treating of the development of ideals, Mr. Davies shows
the confusion existing in the naturalistic and the theological treatment.
"Wi th the one, the ideal has an objective character, an existence out-
side the individual consciousness, to which the individual conscious-
ness may approach, but which it may not comprehend" (p. 483).
But this places the ideal beyond the life of men. "Wi th the other,
the ideal must find its place within the experience of those in whom it
is operative, but then it is no longer an ideal, but just a bit of the com-
mon experience of common men. On this view, the only improve-
ment is self-improvement" (p. 483).
Mr. Davies then makes an effort to find the actual state of affairs
by attempting to improve Professor Baldwin's theory of imitation.
Imitation does not, so says Mr. Davies, account for the phenomena
of differentiation in social organization. Imitation is always a repro-
ductive affair (p. 485). Mr. Davies works out symbolically this idea
of change as follows: ' ' There is, as we conceive it, a contrast be-
tween a presented content B — the person who is doing the unusual
thing—and a represented content a — the person who usually does
what is now being done — mediated through the act of undressing,
etc.—xyz. What is getting done—xyz—calls up the image of A—a—
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which fails to get verified in the child's experience through the presence
of B. Or, to put it another way, and at the same time to emphasize
another aspect of the case, B arouses the expectation fqr which fails
to get realized through the substitution of xyz. But xyz calls up a,
and thereby throws into conflict, by the meaning each has come to
have in experience, two previously emphasized points of the environ-
ment A and B. These, as we understand, are the conditions under
which on the basis of imitation both intellectual and moral develop-
ment normally takes place. Intellectually, the problem means that
the judgments of value, B is pqr and A. is xyz, must give place to a
higher synthesis through which pqr and xyz may both serve as predi-
cates qualifying the same subject B. Morally, the same situation may
be interpreted as one of allowing, through growth in mental faculty,
an ideal element — a — to serve as a reconstructive factor in behavior
in the given relation B — pqr" (p. 488).
All this is quite correct and, barring its symbolical dress, well put.
But does it really differ much from Baldwin's statements as seen
throughout his Social and Ethical Interpretations? I need cite
only one to show the similarity.
" We may say that each of the situations which arises from his effort
to reproduce the copy is an invention of the child's. It is so because
he works it out; no one else in the world knows it or can reproduce
it. He aims, it is true, not at anything new; he aims at the thing the
copy set for him to imitate. But what he does differs both from this
and from anything he has ever done before. It is a synthesis of old
material, of his old pictures of finger-movements, in this case, with
the new picture presented to his eye, and his old strains of muscle,
shortness of breath, rushing of blood, setting of glottis, bending of
joints, etc. But the outcome — that is new. . . . He has a new thing
to contemplate and he is withal a new person to contemplate i t ." '
This statement is but one of many.
As regards the function of the ideal in life, Mr. Davies brings out
well the contrast between the static view of Hume, and the functional
view. From the naturalistic view of Hume, the ideal can only be a
content of consciousness, and so can have no functional value. But
we must consider the ideal both as a bit of experience and as trans-
cendent. The ideal is transcendent in that it is a content qualitatively
distinct from the presented material of consciousness. " This difference
is indicated by the term — idea — which is used to describe this class
of content." (p. 493).
1
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So far as we can see from the discussion of Mr. Davies, the point
which he wishes to emphasize is that the ideal is a functional trans-
cendent unit, based upon individual experience and differing from such
experience. But his interpretation of Baldwin's theory of imitation
seems somewhat askew. This, however, by no means interferes with
the excellence of his treatment, as such. FELIX ARNOLD.
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The College Woman's Code of Honor. AMY E. TANNER. Ped.
Sem., 1906, XIII., Pp. 104-117.
A number of questions regarding what the answerer would do in
various situations that are likely to occur and involving petty tempta-
tions and fine moral discrimination were given to the young women of
several women's colleges and co-educational colleges. The answers
from 440 students indicate that one half would condemn keeping car-
fare uncalled for, using a ' pony,' using a point accidentally seen on
another's paper during an examination, and telling stories to a credu-
lous girl, while the rest would defend such action or decide variously
according to the exact circumstances of the case. There is little con-
demnation of ' bluffing' in recitations, telling white lies, exaggerating,
or the acceptance of unduly favorable opinions of self. The college
girl has a thoroughgoing contempt for sneaking and out and out lying,
but with sufficient intelligence and sense of humor in most cases to
enjoy any sort of contest with wits even though she risks her scholarly
reputation.
Socially she is on the whole warm hearted enough to sacrifice the
truth in small matters to the demands of friendship and courtesy, but
rarely has she sufficient social sense to undertake the punishment of a
wrong doer. The author emphasizes the need of more democracy and
self government in school and college. E. A. KJRKPATRICK.
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